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Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

James Andow

pp. 2631-2643

Abstract

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers’ worry—the folk seem to agree!

Publication details

Published in:

Hüttemann Andreas (2017) Causation and structuralism. Synthese 194 (7).

Pages: 2631-2643

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7

Full citation:

Andow James (2017) „Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?“. Synthese 194 (7), 2631–2643.