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189247

Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes

James M Brown James Christian BrownRobert Brown

pp. 17-21

Abstract

After surveying some of the interesting aspects of perception, Tennessen argues that we 'seem to need something like a world view, a global conceptual scheme, a conceptual frame of reference." There is, Tennessen quite rightly claims, no such thing as a neutral given. The belief that there could be something prior to any theory, a pristine "testimony of the senses," is nothing more than a myth; we can see only from some "point of view" or other.

Publication details

Published in:

Mos Leendert (1986) Annals of theoretical psychology. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 17-21

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4615-6453-9_2

Full citation:

Brown James M, Brown James Christian, Brown Robert (1986) „Tennessen and the problem of conceptual schemes“, In: L. Mos (ed.), Annals of theoretical psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, 17–21.