Analytic philosophers have until recently been reluctant to investigate the complex historical roots of their own philosophical tradition. Slowly, but surely, however, the necessary work is being done, and it is interesting in this respect that not only the Anglo-Saxon but also the Continental roots of analytic philosophy are being usefully illuminated.² For as Michael Dummett points out in his Origins of Analytic Philosophy, the habit of referring to analytic philosophy as "Anglo-American' represents a grave historical distortion: such philosophy "could at least as well be called "Anglo-Austrian'".³ As Dummett notes, many tendencies in Central European thought contributed to the early development of analytic philosophy. Dummett himself concentrates on just one aspect of this historical complex, namely on the relationship between the theories of meaning and reference developed by Frege and by Husserl in the years around the turn of the century. It is to this specific issue, too, that the present essay is devoted, though we shall here attempt a more sympathetic reading of Husserl "s views on these matters than is to be found in Dummett's work.