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Future Paths of Phenomenology

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201916

Actions, causes, and supervenience

Simone Gozzano (University of L'Aquila)

pp. 113-118

Abstract

The debate between "intentionalists' and "causalists' is still open. Its main points can be summarized in questions such as: are reasons causes? Can we conceive actions as effects of mental causes? According to "intentionalists' we should reply in the negative to both questions; "causalists", on the contrary, maintain that an affirmative answer is possible. Among the first group, Georg Henrik von Wright has argued that the link between reasons and actions is logical or conceptual; in the second group, Donald Davidson has defended the possibility of conceiving reasons as causes of actions. In this paper I present a critical argument concerning the identification of actions with physical (causal) events advanced by Davidson.

Publication details

Published in:

Egidi Rosaria (1999) In search of a new humanism: the philosophy of Georg Henrik Von Wright. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 113-118

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1852-3_11

Full citation:

Gozzano Simone (1999) „Actions, causes, and supervenience“, In: R. Egidi (ed.), In search of a new humanism, Dordrecht, Springer, 113–118.