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181222

Toward an epistemological basis for humanistic psychology

Harold G. Coward Joseph R. Royce

pp. 109-134

Abstract

It may be that each period in the history of human thought manifests a dominant philosophic presupposition or Weltanschauung. The general populace, and even some of the educated who should know better, are culturally conditioned to uncritical acceptance of whatever way of thinking happens to be dominant at the time. As Susanne Langer (1948, p. 15) aptly puts it: "such implicit "ways' are not avowed by the average man, but simply followed.... They constitute his outlook; they are deeper than facts he may note or propositions he may moot." Langer goes on to show that the adoption of a particular way of thinking effectively limits the kinds of questions one can ask. Thus, each age produces its own questions, which in turn generate the particular academic enterprise of that era.

Publication details

Published in:

Royce Joseph R., Mos Leendert (1981) Humanistic psychology: concepts and criticisms. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 109-134

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4684-1071-6_6

Full citation:

Coward Harold G., Royce Joseph R. (1981) „Toward an epistemological basis for humanistic psychology“, In: J. R. Royce & L. Mos (eds.), Humanistic psychology, Dordrecht, Springer, 109–134.