Bayne Tim (2010) The unity of consciousness. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bermúdez José Luis (2011) „Bodily awareness and self-consciousness“, In: S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 157–179.

Billon Alexandre, Kriegel Uriah (2015) „Jaspers' dilemma: The psychopathological challenge to subjectivity theories of consciousness“, In: R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, n/a.

Blanke Olaf, Metzinger Thomas (2009) „Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood“. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), 7–13.

Bortolotti Lisa (2010) Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press.

Brentano Franz (1995) Descriptive psychology, ed. Müller Benito. London-New York, Routledge.

Brentano Franz (1982) Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. Chisholm Roderick, Baumgartner Wilhelm. Hamburg, Meiner.

Campbell John (1999) „Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process“. The Monist 82, 609–625.

Carruthers Peter (2000) Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dainton Barry (2004) „The self and the phenomena“. Ratio 17 (4), 365–389.

Dainton Barry (2008) The phenomenal self. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Dretske Fred (2002) „How do you know that you are not a zombie?“, In: B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged access, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Fernández Jordi (2010) „Thought insertion and self-knowledge“. Mind and Language 25, 66–88.

Gallagher Shaun (2000) „Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification“, In: D. Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the self, Amsterdam, Benjamins, 203–242.

Ganeri Jonardon (1999) „Self-intimation, memory and personal identity“. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27, 469–483.